Implementation of food strategies and prospects for the future. Communication from the Commission to the Council. COM (86) 198 final, 10 April 1986 by unknown
COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES 
COM(86)  198  final 
Brussels,  10  April  1986 
Implementation  of  Food  Strategies  and  Prospects 
for  the  Future 
(Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council) 
COM(86)  198  final FOOD  STRATEGIES  :  THEIR  TMPLEMENTATIOH  AND  rROSPECTS 
FOP.  THE  IUIUI!l 
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
Abbreviations  iii 
1.  INTRODUCTION  1 
2.  ANALYSIS  OF  EXPERIENCE  IN  RELATION  TO  LOME  Ill  PROGRAMMING  4 
2.1.  The  case  of  Mali  4 
2.2.  The  case  of  Zambia  13 
2.3.  Food  strategy  in other  ACP  countries  19 
Review  as  programming 
3.  GENERAL  REVIEW  AND  FUTURE  PROSPECTS  26 
3.1.  Food  and  agricultural  development  policies  26 
3.2.  Methodology  32 
3.3.  Future  prospects  35 
February  i936 SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
Since  1982,  the  Community  has  been  active  in  ~upporting tbe  implementation  of 
food  strategies  in  fot1r  African  countries.  The  time  has  come  for  an  assessment 
o f  t· h i s  i n  i t i a l  L' x  p  e r i L'll c  E.:  i n  or de r  t o  CJ a i n  some  use f u l  i n s i g  11 t s  f o r  t h  <?  f ·~ •.  'J r  7 
now  that  the  Lome  Ill  Convention  is  coming  into  force,  enabling  this  approa~h 
to  be  extended  to  all  the  ACP  countries. 
An  in  depth  a~alysis has  been  made  for  two  of  the  four  pilot  countries 
~1hich  ilre  dissimilar  from  several  r>oints  of  view:  on  the  one  hand,  Mali, 
where  the  food  strategy  is  explicitly  acknowledged  as  a  component  of 
national  policy  and  where  the  EC  has  become  the  driving  force;  Zambia,  on 
the  other  hand,  where  the  concept  of  food  strategy as  such  i~  far  from 
central  to  policy discussions  and  where  the  role  of  the  EC  is  generaly  speakin; 
more  modest. 
Despite  these  differences,  it  is  evident  that  the  food  policy  reforms  that 
have  been  put  into practice  are  very  similar,  both  in  terms  of  the 
successes  <e:g·  liberalisation of  the  cereals  market)  and  the  weaknesses 
<e.g.  struct~'t"al  measures  t.o  benefit  small  holders). It should  be  noted, 
moreover,  that  in  both  cases  the  food  strategy dialogue  has  been  set 
within  the  context  of  a  broader  dialogue  on  socio-economic  policies 
involving other  donors  or  international  bodies. 
A preliminary  review  of  Lome  Ill programming  shows  that,  in  nearly all  cou~tri~; 
food  and  agricultural  development  has  been  singled out  as  the  concentration 
sector  to  which,  on  average,  about  80  % of  programmed 
allocated. 
resources  will  be 
The  rural  development  measures  and  plans  for  specific  actions  have,  overall, 
been  worked  out  in  a  food  strategy  con.text.  Further work  is nevertheless 
required  regarding  the  formulation  of  food  policies and  methodology 
. I. i i . 
- lhe  food  strategy apr>roach  should  have  an  impact  on  cooperation  with  ACP 
r.CII.IItl.rics  ill  fJ""''I'ill  ;rrul  ~·.lrurrld  IH:  reflected  in  the  indicative  progra'rnmes 
from  rrow  orr  llrr.•  c.-:I•••J·•r  i·.,JI i"n  of  tire  four  pilot  countrie~,  ~Jill 
CJr il d  IJ il L  .L y  l 0  ~  r:  !; i g II i-f i L d II c L'  • 
-Efforts  to  improve  food  and  agricultural  policies  have  until  now 
hcen  focussed  on  r>ricing  and  marketing.  Though  more  can  be  done  in 
this  field,  a  broader  approach  is  required  and  more  attontion paid  to 
structural  agricultural  policies  (which  should  seek to  place  family 
smnll-holdings  at  the  centre of  the  production  process)  and  on· 
consumer  policies  (with  a  view  to  creating  a  stable  market  for  local 
produce)·. 
- As  regards .methodology,  there  needs  to  be  better  coordination  at 
Community  l~vel  (taking  account  also of  broader  coordination· 
initiatives of  course).  In  the  policy dialogue ·with  beneficiary 
countries,  there  should,  in addition  to  discussions  on  general  issues 
of  food  and  agricultural  policy,  be  more  focus  on  specific operational 
themes  and  in  this  case  the  dialogue  sh0uld  take  place  with  a  body 
having  full  policy authority  in  the  area  in question. 
- In  the  implementation  of  the  indicative  programmes,  more  work  is 
needed  on  the  ways  in  which  general  guidelines  or  cooperation  can  be 
translated  into  sectoral  and  sub-sectoral  policies  which  in  turn  provide 
a  coherent  framework  for  the  various  specific  projects  and  activities 
to  be  financed  unther  the  sixth  EDF. 
- Finally,  some  consideration  should  be  given  to  the  ways  and  means 
by  which  this  approach  can  be  extended  to  cooperation  with  countries 
outside  the  ACP  group. Abbreviations 
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During  the  (Development)  Council  of  6/11/84,  when  the  Commission  document 
"Food  Strategies  - Review  and  Prospects"  was  examined,  the  Commission 
conunilted  ilsL'lf  to  present  •:a  more  systematic evaluation of  these  stra-
teyies  and  an  atternpl  at  a  flll'~tliucloloSJical  analysis  for  lhe  futur~  together 
with  a  brief  assessment  of  the  situation  in  other  developing  countries  to 
which  the  food  strategy  support  could  be  extended". 
lhis  document  contains  an  analysis  of  the  accumulated  experience  and  sets 
out  some  guidelines  for  the  future. 
As  for  future action,  it is  necessary  to  take  account  of  the  third  ACP-EEC 
Convention  signed  on  the  8/12/84  in  Lom6.  This  new  Convention  integrates 
the  main  characteristics  of  the  "food  strategy"  initiative within  the 
general  framework  of  aid  implementation.  This  makes  it possible  to  go 
beyond  the  experimental  phase  during  which  the  EC  supported  food  strate~y 
implementation  in  four  countries  (Mali,  Kenya,  Rwanda,  Zambia)  and  pro-
vided  some  ad  hoc  financial  assistance  (food  aid,  art.  958,  etc ••• )  fo~ 
this  purpos~.  From  now  on,  the  food  strategy approach  should  become  a 
guiding  factor  in  cooperation  with  all  ACP  countries  and  have  an  impact, 
at  the  Level  of  the  various  countries,  on  the  implementation  of  the  indi-
cative  programmes.  In  this  way,  as  the  implementation  of  Lom6  III  pro-
gresses,  the  category  of  "food  strategy  countries"  wiLL  Lose  its signi-
ficance  and  give  way  to  a  wider  variety of  groups  of  countries  which 
will  to  one  extent  or  another,  be  applying  a  similar  approach. 
In  order  to  prepare  this  new  plan,  this  paper  contains  an.  analysis 
of  the  outcomes  of  the  experimental  phase  in  two  countries,  Mali  and 
Zambia,  together  with  an  analysis  of  indicative  programmes  already  con-
cluded  in  about  thirty  ACP  countries.  The  experience  in  the  twoother 
food  strategy  countries,  Rwanda  and  Kenya,  though  ~ot analysed  in detail, 
has  also obviously been  taken  into account. 
. I. 2. 
Starting  fr·om  this  analysis  proposals  are  being put .forward 
fnr  the  continuation  and  reinforcement  of  this experience. 
lhe  choice  of  Mali  and  larnbia  is  based  on  certain  charaue-
ristics  of  these  countries 
Mali  as  well  as  Zambia  can  each  be  considered  representative 
of  a  group  of  African  countries. 
rn  Mali,  a  Sahelian  country  with  few  non-agri~ultural  resources 
and  an  erratic  climate,  the  Community  and  the  Member  States 
play  a  predominant  role  in  trade  as  well  as  development  coope-
ration.  Mali  participates  in  the  CFA  monetary  system  and  its 
rate  of  inflation  is  comparable  with  France•~.  Zambia  hai 
considerable  non-agricultural  resources  and  is  one  of  the  most 
urbanised  African  countries.  The  Zambian  economy  is  less  depen-
dent  on  foreign  assistance. 
Moreover,  Zambia's  level  of  external  debt  is  among  the  highest 
in  Af~ica and  debt  servicing weighs  heavily on  the  economy. 
Some  preliminary  remarks  on  methodology  are  called  for  : 
a.  The  starting point  has  to  be  the  definition and  implementation 
of  food  strategy or policy  :by the  government  concerned.  The 
strategy has  to  be  set  in  the  contact  of all  the development 
policies  (for  the  rural  sector  in particular),  the  economic 
policies  etc •••  and  take  account  of  trends  in  the  social  and 
economic  situation on  the  country  concerned. 
b.  The  initiatives  taken  by  the  EC  to  support  this  strategy  have 
to  be  placed  in  the  context  of  efforts undertaken  by  the  govern-
ment  and  the  intervention of  other donors.  In  general,  it will 
be  impossible  to  identify  the  exact  contribution made  by  the 
various  parties  concerned,  to  the  final  outcomes. 
c.  Community  efforts, directly  linked  with  food  strategy  implemen-
tation  (food  aid,  projects  of  the  Special  Programme  art.  958 
e.g.)  have  to  relate to  the  overall  framework  of  cooperation 
between  the  EC  and  the  countries  concerned. 
. I. 3. 
The  following  section of  the  document  contains first  an  analysis 
of  the  experience  of  food  strategies  in  Mali  and  Zambia,  and  an 
cJruly:.;i~  uf  their  Lome  I!I  indir:ativ~ programmP.s. 
There  is  then  a  review  of  some  of  the  main  trends  emerging  from 
the  Lome  III  indicative programmes  and  some  concrete  examples 
are  given  as  illustrations. 
In  a  third  section  (Review  and  future  prospects),  an  attempt  is  mad~ 
to structure  these  elements  of  analysis  and  to  identify  some 
broad  guideline~ for  food  and  agricultural  policy  and  th~ apprdach 
to be  followed  in  the  years  to  come. 
·. 4. 
2.  1\NI\L.:YSi-S  OF. THE  EXPERIENCE  IN  ·RElATION  WITH  LOME  HI ·PROGRI\MMIN.G: 
?.1.  CASE  !>IUD'(:  MALl 
2.1.1.  ~r_«:_!._~.~dnar.!__~_:>.!_l_!>ider_a_!i_<?~~ 
The  EC  has  been  involved  in· supporting  the  food  strategy  in  rotat'i;  since 
the  end  of  1982.  The  aims  of  the  stra•~nY as  set  out  in  the  document 
of  the  Mali  Ministry  of  Agriculture  (~ugust E2)  was  to attain  ~ood 
self-sufficiency at  the  national  level,  to  become  ultimately  a  c~reals 
exporter  and  to  guarantee  a  balanced  food  diet  for  the  whole  population. 
The  main  lines  of  the  strategy  can  be  summarized  as  follows 
a.  Relaunching  the  cereals market 
(i)  restructuring  of  the  market 
Cii)  price  incentives  for  producers 
<iii)  unsubsidized  consumer  prices 
(iv)  efficient  marketing 
b.  Strengthening  of  the  agricultural  production  system 
(i)  •  •.  restructuring  of  the  Rural  Development  Operations  COORs> 
(ii) -agricultural  credit 
<iii)  intensification of  agricultural  production 
c.  Strengthening of  food  security 
Before  examining  the  policy  measures  taken  since  the  inception  of  the 
food  strategy  initiative, it  should  be  noted  that  two  external  factors 
have  had  a  major  impact  on  the  evolution  of  the  economic  situation in 
Mali . 
..  In .the  first  place,  the  three  consecutiv_e  years  of  drought  <82-84>  have 
had  a  devastating  effect  on  the  population  and  the  economies  of  the 
Sahelian  countries,  particularly  in Mali.  This  natural  catastrophe 
upset  policy priorities and  made  it difficult  ~ if not  impossible - to 
attain  certain objectives. 
In  the  second  place,  as  in  other  African  countries,  Mali  suffered the 
combined  impact  of  the  international crisis and  the  consequences cf  bad 
economic  management  in  the 70's. 
.I. 5. 
The  government  efforts,  as  well  as  the  donors'  contribution,  were  aimed 
in  th~  first  place  at  remedying  the  consequences  of  the  drought  and 
illlf•''"'i"'l  11,..  r··lt.'rnal  finances  and  budgetary  situation of  the  countr. 
In  this  context,  it  is  important  to  mention  the  re-integration of  Mali 
in  the  UMOA.  This  was  achieved  according to  the  rlanned  timetable  in 
June  1984  after  successfully  carrying  out  a  drastic  restructuring ~ 0 licy 
lhe  restrictive  economic  polir.y  constitutes  the  general  framework  in 
which  the  food  strategy  is  being  implemented. 
It  is  hardly  surprising  that  progress  on  a  number  of  points  of  the 
strategy  has  been  rather  limited.  Nevertheless,  in  several  crucial 
economic  areas,  specific measures  have  been  taken,  particularly  for 
reviving  food  production. 
2.1.?..  Cereals  marketing  restructuring  programme  (PRMC) 
The  sta"rting  point  and  cornerstone  of  the  Mali  food  strategy  is  the 
cereals  marketing  restructuring  programme  (PRMC)  that  started  in  the 
crop  year  81/82.  This  rather  ambitious  programme  is  designed  to 
relaunch  the  cereals  sector  by  means  of  trade  liberalisation,  a  policy 
of  price  incentives  for  producers,  elimination of  consumer  subsidies 
and  improvements  in  the  management  of  the  Food  Products  Marketing 
Board  (OPAM).  This  programme  is  financed  by  counterpart  funds  generat~d 
by  the  sale  of  food  aid  committed  on  a  multiannual  basis  by  a  group 
of  donors. 
After  four  years  of  operation,  the  results  are  quite  encouraging  and 
can  be  summarized  as  follows  : 
Trade  liberalisation 
Trade  in  rainfed  crops  (mais,  millet,  sorghum)  has  been'tiberalised 
thereby  strengthening  the  role of  private  traders;  liberalisation of 
rice  trading  follows  at  a  slower  rhythm. 
.I. 6. 
·ouring·the 85-86 ·cr:op  year~' however:,  produc-e,from-the·lr:r'i:gat·ed.--rice, 
<1i  i~'"::;  or· the  Office ·du  'Hqcr  r!:ay  be  bought  hy  private  traders 
a:;·lr<,rtllllid  r._.l,ru.Jr"f·  lri  prinr.iplt>,frorn  the  next  crop  year ..  f-8/,-R?,' 
onwards,-private  trade-rs  will  be  able  to start theiractiv.ities.asfrom-
the  beginning  of  the  marketing  period. 
Trade  Liberalization  strengthens  competition and  reduces  commercial 
margins,  making  it  possible  for  free  market  price~ to  be  higher  for 
the  producer  and  lower  for  the  consumer. 
fcrr·als- l'larkE:t· regulation 
Playing  the  role  of  buyer  and  seller of  last  resort,  OPAM  should 
contribute  tn  market  stabilizatirn  •  Its performance,  in  this  area, 
has  to  be  evaluated  in  a  balanced  way  : 
a.  As  regards  the  purchase  of  food  products 
In  tpe  81-85  period,  OPAM  has  been  able  ,  because  of  its official 
monopoly  position,  to  maintain  its  rice  purchases  at  a  similar 
level,  independantly of  the  price policy adopted. 
As  regar·ds  maize  ,  millet  and  surghum,  however  OPAM  purchases  felL 
from  17,000 T.  to  3,.000  T.  between  81  and  85.  This  was  due  to  the 
fall  in quantities offered on  the  market,  caused  not  only  by  the 
drought  but  also because  the official purchasing price,  starting 
from  a  relatively  Low  level  in  81,  rose  even  more  slowly  than 
the  cost  of  Living  and  remained below  the  price  in  most  of  the 
neighbouring  countries. 
-It--is  true that -p-roduce-rs -have- recei-ved  a  f-ai-rLy  good--J:>I"i-ce 
per  kg  from  the private traders  but  OPAM's  impact  on  the  purchase 
side  of  the  market  has  been  very  limited~  It  is  interesting 
however  that  information  already available on  the  85-86  crop.year 
indicate  that,  in  a  period of  good  harverst,  the  official  purchasin; 
price(currently 55  FCFA/kg)  is  functioning  as  a  floor  price:at this:'-
OPAM  may  be  able  to  buy  about  60,000  T.  during  the  85-86  crop  year 
(end  February  86). 
.I. 7. 
b.  As  regards  sales of  food  products  : 
0PAM  markets  not  only  locally  bought  cereals 
but  also  cereals  received  as  foorl  aid  and  in  so  doing  controls 
.1hnu1:  ?r,%  nf  th••  total  sales  (compared  with  less  than  10% of 
purchases  011  avt:ruqd.  OI'AM  has  therefore  a  very  real  impact  on 
food  supply  to  th~  towns. 
This  is  revealed  in  two  ways 
the  supply  of  cereals  to  outlying  regions  such  as  Gao  and 
Tombouctou  :  despite  a  high  scale  of  activity  in  those  regions, 
neglect~rl  by  anrl  large  by  private  traders  because  of  trans~ort 
rlifficulties  and  high  costs,  OPAM  has  not  been  able  to  satisfy 
fully  the  demand  and  the  needs  of  the  affected  population  in 
those  zones  during  the  drought, 
OPAM  sales  prices  remained  below  the  market  price until  1985. 
As  it  has  no  marketing  channds~of it5 own,  OP/l.r.,  sP.lls  to 
preferential  group~ such  as  public  utilities,  the  public  adminis-
tr~tion,  local  cooperatives  etc •••  . 
Th~s  type  of  marketing  m~ans that  the  bene~it 6f  the  low  OPAM  pric~s 
goes  to  certain  groups  that  are  not  exactly  among  the  most  disadvar.tc;. 
Nev~rtheless  important  progress  has  been  made  with  the  GoverMrne~t's 
recent  decision  (November  85)  to  fix  ~he price  of  ~aize - millet 
and  sorghum  at  95  FCFA/kg  and  the  price of  rice at  165  FCFA/kg. 
These  pric~s  are  in  fact  at  the  level  of  the  market  pri~e  and 
will  allow  OPAM  to  enter  in  competition  with  private  trade  and 
to  play a  role  as  seller  of  last.rescrt~ 
It  is  important  to  assess  the  cereals  policy  in  the  general  cor.tex:  ~7 
Mali  econo~y and  the  relations  between  Mali  and  the  aid  donors. 
It.  was  in effect  as  a  result  of  the  pressure  exerted by  the  IMF 
through  its negociations  with  Mali  on  the  renewal  of  its  standby 
credit  that  GRM  adopted  the  prices  proposed  by  the  PRMC  donors  in 
november  85. 
-The  difficult  economic  and  budgetary  situation  and  the  social  and 
political  tensions  go  a  long  way  to  explain  the  hesitations  of  th~ 
government  about  honouring  its commitments  on  price policy  : 
.I. 8. 
Civil  servants  that  had  already  to  suffer  salary  freezes  were  the  first  tc 
feel  the  price  increas~ for  sales  of  OPAM  cereals •. 
In  rx~h~nq~ fnr  its  important  but  difficult  decision  to  increase 
OI'M~  I" i· ··  .,  t ,,,.  'l'''!<'rnmcnt  asked  PRMC  rlnnors  to  assume  a  larger 
part  of  deficit  of  the  cereals  se'ctor. 
OP/\M  Management 
The  efforts  made  to  improve  OPAM's  efficiency  have  been  rather  successful 
between  the  year  81/82  and  84/85  the  deficit  diminished  by  almost  40  %. 
Moreover,  the  F3oards  administration  has  been  improved  (for  example  by-
transfering part  of  the  transport  activities  frcm  OPAM  to  the  private 
sector)  and  a  start  has  been  made  with  rationalizing  staff. 
Despite  this,  much  has  still  to  be  done.  The  better  financial  situativn 
of  the  Board  is  for  instance  not  simply  due  to better management;other 
factors  have  a  direct  impact  on  the  deficit  such  as  the  relative  signi-
ficance  of  food  aid  and  local  purchases  in  the  Board's  sales,  the  share 
of  various  regions  in  the  sales/distributions .of  the  Board  etc •••• 
Moreover  other  external  elements  such  as  the  rescheduling of  OPAM  deb~s 
have  contributed directly to  its  improved  financial  situation. 
2.1.3.0therselementsin  the  Mali  food  trategy 
The  PRMC  is  a  central  alement  in  the  Mali  food  strategy and  is  largely 
responsible  for  its succes.  The  results  achieved  by  the  PRMC,however, 
also  depend  on  what  happens  in  other  areas  of  policy.  Here,  despite  s0-e 
progress,  the  proces  of  change  has  been  rather stow • 
. I. 9. 
This  is  true,  in  the  first  instance,  for  the  restructuring  of  the 
Rurat  Devclorment  Operations. 
IJ"  1 i 1.  I  ' " ,  ~~ ,  a l t 1  •  r 1 t i o  11  II a :;  be en  con cent r a t e d  i n  11 a r t i r u l a r  on  t h  c 
"Offir:·~  ri•J  tJiyer"  <o~J)  lhe  most  important,but  also  the  least  effic1cnt 
pt~ddy  producer.  Prog•·ess  has  been  made  in  ON-management  and  in  its 
relations  with  agricultural  producers. 
The  GRM  has  also  drawn  up  policy  guidelines  designed  to  restore  normal 
financial  operating  conditions  for  the  ON. 
The  governmenls  decision  stipulates that  the  main  function  of  the  ON 
will  be  to  provide  advisory  services  for  producers,  im~ying a 
progressive  reduction  of  its  existing direct  interventions  and  a 
gradual  transfer of  certain  responsibilities  to  the  produce~s 
themselves. 
In  this  context  it  is  important  to  mention  the  creation of  the  National 
·Agricultural  Development  Bank  (BNDA)  in  charge of  the  improvement  of 
this  rural  credit  system,  which  is  a  main  element  of  agricultural 
development. 
2.1.4.  Food  strategy and  planning 
The  Consultative  Committee  for  the  Definition  and  Follow-up  of  the 
food  strategy  (CESA)  was  created  in 1982  as  a  body  to  develop  ideas  on  :~~ 
food  strategy as  well  as  coordinate  and  stimulate  its  implementation. 
Seven  interministerial  working  groups  were  set  u~ to  consider  in  the 
CESA  framework  ecological  zoning,  statistics, research,  processing, 
marketing  logistics  and  consumption  • 
CESA  pays  a  role  in  the  preparation  of  the  87-92  Plan. 
Indeed,  food  strategy  and  desertification  control  have  been  chosen as 
the  main  themes  for  the  next  Plan.  In  this  way,  the  strategy  goes 
beyond  the  field  of  food  and  nutrition .and  will  serve  as  a  basic 
principle  for  the  selection  of  programmes,projects  and  actions  to  b~ 
carried  out  in  various  social  and  economic  sectors. 
The  CESA  working  parties  should  provide  an  essential  input  to  all  the 
work  involved  in  implementing  the  food  strategy,  although  until  now, 
CESA's  impact  has  been  rather  insignificant. 
. I. 2.1. 5. 
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With  the  exception  of  CESA's  role  as  a  consultation bodi  for  the 
preparation  of  the  document  submitted  to  the  Second  multi-
,J,,,  .. ,  rn•'r>l  ·i"'l  in  December  85,  few  concrete  results  have  been 
.t•.l•••.:v•:•L  lh1•;  i<>  rnainly  due  to  the  lack  of  means  at  CESA's 
disposal  ilnd  to  its  inarpror>riate  place  in  the  GRM  structure. 
Indeed,  CESA  can  hardly  be  ~xpected to  fulfill  its  objectives. 
The  leadership  role  for  the  whole  of  the  planning  exercice 
is  entrusted to  the  Ministry  of  Planning  which  coordinates  the 
work  done  in  the  various  regions  and  the  various  technical 
Ministries.  CESA  would  be  the  ideal  body  to ensure  that  food 
strategy preoccur>ations  were  taken  fully  into  account  in  the 
rlan,  but  to  fulfil  that  role  there  has  to be  a  better  system 
of  coordination  between  CESA's  activities  and  those  of  the 
Ministry  of  Planning. 
Community  support  for  the  Mali  strategy 
As  explained  above  the  PRMC  is  the  central  element  of  the  food 
strategy and  has  achieved  wost  results. 
The  EC  supported  rR~C directly by  supplying  food  aid  which  in 
turn  generated  counterpart  funds.  It  should  be  emphasized  that 
this  support  was  integrated  in a  multiannual  multidonor  programme 
which  is  the  first  of  its  kind. 
The  amount  of  programmable  funds  allocated to  Mali  by  the 5th  EDF 
has  been  increased  from  85  to  96  MECU.  This  increase will  be 
used  in  the  restructuring  plan of  the  "Office  du  Niger"  to  support 
crop  intensification  in  the  irrigated areas,  and  thus  help  to  raise 
farming  income  and  improve  food  security. 
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In  the  Special  Programme  to  Combat  W0rld  Hunger,  Mali  received  a 
total  of  8.3  MECU  (5  MECU  on  the  83  budget  and  3.3  MECU  on  the 
8~  bud~et)which will  be  used  for  : 
- 'J"f'pur·tinu  l/f(:  cooperation  movement  (through  village  assuLiatiu,,_,; 
-technical  assistance  (financing  studies)  and  facilities  for  CESA; 
- an  agricultural  credit  programme  (BNDA); 
- the  supply  of  agricultural  inputs  ; 
- environmental  protection and  conservation  of  agricultural 
resources  (improved  stoves,  reconstitution  of  tree  cover, 
savings  in  wood  fuel). 
Even  before  the  EC  decided  to  support.explicitely  the  Mali  food 
strategy,  cooperation  between  Mali. and  the  EC  had  given  priority 
to  rUral  development,  and  basic  economic  infrastructure. 
30  %of  4th  EDF  (Lom6  1)  and  62  X of  5th  EDF  (Lom6  II)  have  thus 
been  allocated  to  rural  and  agricultural  development. 
It  ~.an  therefore  be  said  that  the  policy dialogue  relating  to  the 
food  strategy served,  to maintain  and  further  strengthen  the 
priority attached to  the  rural  sector.  Indeed,  the  Lome  III 
Indicative  Programme  allocates  90  X of  the  available  means  to 
the  support  of  the  food  strategy and  desertification control. 
In  this  context,  the  Government  has  amongst  other  things 
committed  itself to  : 
- continue  its policy  to  improve  incentives  for  farmers  and 
Liberalize  the  cereals  market 
- continue  the  restructuring  of  the  Rural  Development  Operations  ; 
- modify  the  land  tenure  situation  in  order  to make  optimum  use  of 
water  resources  ; 
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-dra  .  .,,  up  .:1  hcillth  and  nutritional  poli·c:y  fo.r  drought  victims; 
- 1rn,,rovt~  lit~<~ I. th  and.  edUt:-Jl ion  services  in  rural  area.s. 
The  EC  actionsin s.ur>port  of  these  policies  w-ill  in particular 
continue  support  for  the  PRMC  (use of  food  aid counterpart  fund~>.; 
-provide  support  for  village  associations,  in particular with  a 
view  to  intensifying agriculture  and  improving  environmental 
conservation; 
- give  assistance  for  rural  migrations  from  arid  zones  to  regions  with 
more  agricultural  potential. 13. 
2.2.  CASE  STUDY  ZAMBIA 
2.2.1.  PreliminRry  observations 
During  the  sixties  and  seventies,  Zambian  agriculture 
was  neglected  in  comparison  with  the  mining  sector. 
Mining  exports  generated  the  foreign  exchange  needed 
to  finance  import~ to  build up  public  administration 
and  develop  urban  infrastructure.  The  role of agriculture 
was  to  supply  cheap  food  for  the  urban  population.  The 
combination  of  inadequate price  incentives,  population 
growth  and  availability of  foreign  exchange  led  to  a 
rapid  growth  of  food  imports. 
Around  the  end  of  the  seventies,  when  the  profitability 
of  mining  declined  rapidly  (Lower  prices  of  copper,  higher 
prices  for  energy  and  transport,  decrease  in production)  a 
reorientation of  economic  policies  became  necessary.  In 
this  context  a  better  use  of  Zambia's  vast  agricultural 
potential  was  needed.  The  Zambian  government  was  well  aware 
of  this  necessity.  Right  from  the  beginning,  the  policy 
dialogue  with  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  focused 
on  how  to  organize  such  a  reorientation  towards  agricultu~e. 
However,  the  agricultural  and  food  policy dialogue  was 
gradually  enl~rged to  more  general  economic.  restructuring 
problems. 
2.2.2.  From  food  strategy dialogue  to  economic  restructuring dialog~~ 
In  1980,  President  Kaunda  launched  "Operation  Food  Product ior." 
making  Zambia  one  of  the  first  African  countries  to  define  a~ 
integrated  approach  to  rural  development  in order  to  increase 
food  security and  to  encourage  agricultural exports.  In  thi~ 
approach  an  important  role  was  foreseen  for  large  state  farm; 
(~ 20,000  ha)  using  advanced  technology.  In  ~ddition to  the 
future  state  farms,  cooperatives  as  well  as  Large  and  small 
scale private  farmers  had  a  role  to  play.  Several  concrete 
measures  to  benefit  private  farmers  were  in  fact  announced . 
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Operation  Food  Production  formed  a  basis  for  ~he 
GRZ-EC  dialogue  on  the  food  strategy.  This  dialogue 
w;1•;  p:Jrl:ir.JJLarly  intense  during  1982  within  the 
"ldU-EC  .Joint  Committee".  The  Community's  initiative 
b~nefited  from  a  detailed study  on  the  food  strategy, 
prepared  with  support  of  the  Netherlands.  The  work 
of  the  Joint  Committee  Led,  in  October  1982,  to  the 
GRZ's  adoption of  a  ''Special  Programme  of  Action  against 
Hunger".  This  programme  constituted an  important  step 
towards  a  well-balanced  food  policy.  No  explicit  reference 
was  made  to  state  farms.  Emphasis  was  put  on  the  production 
of  maize  and  drought-resistant  staples  (sorghum,  miLlet  and 
cassava)  by  small  scale  producers.  The  private  commercial 
sector  was  to  concentrate  on  import  substitution  (particularly 
wheat  and  maize)  and  on  export  crops. 
Particular  attention  was  given  to  Livestock  development, 
especially  in  connection  with  ani~al traction. 
In  the  course  of  1983,  in para L  ~e L with  the  EC  efforts, 
the  World  Bank  and  GRZ  started discussions  on  economic 
adjustment  policies.  Food  policy options  were  presented 
in the  document  "Restructuring  in the  Midst  of  Crisis" 
(chapter  4)  prepared  for  the  Consultative  Group  meeting 
held  in  May  1984.  This  document  reflected  largely the 
recommendations  of  the  Joint  Committee  particularly 
with  respect  to  supporting  small  holder  development • 
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During  1985,  two  further  meetings  of  the  Consulta~ive 
Group  took  place.  GRZ's  position  was  presented  in 
"/\rr  /\d inn  Programme  for  Economic  Restructuring". 
Tile  tatter  document  was  essentially a  further  elaborati'on 
of  the  1984  document  (Restructuring  in  the  midst  of 
crisis)  and  it announced  a  Large  number  of  food  policy 
measures  to  be  taken. 
In  order  to  implement  the  Consultative  Group's  conclusions 
a  "Joint  Monitoring  Committee"  was  formed  in  1984  to 
replace  the  Joint  Committee.  In  addition  to  the  Joint 
Committee  members,  the  new  Committee  also  included  the 
World  Bank  and  several  non-EC  donors.  It  did  not  function 
very effectively,  Largely  because  of  problems  related  to 
the  terms  of  reference  and  due  to  the  absence  of  an  adequate 
secretariat. 
Also  in  1984  GRZ  established within its Ministry of 
Agriculture  an  Investment  Plan  Task  Force  with  a  view 
to  formulating  an  agricultural  action programme.  The 
task  force  had  to  prepare  a  five  year  investment  plan 
to  become  part  of  the  next  development  plan  (delayed 
by  one  year:  87-91).  Several  donors,  including  the 
Community  and  its  Member  States,  have  provided  support 
for  this  task  force,  particularly  by  financing  a  Large 
number  of  studies  covering  subjects  such  as  storage, 
credit,  Livestock,  traditional  crops,  etc ••.. 
Parallel  to  the dialogue  with  the EC  .and  in  the  framework 
of  the  Consultative  Group,  GRZ  also engaged  in  a  dialogue 
with  the  IMF.  In  line  with  IMF  proposals  Zambia 
devalued  its  currency several  times  and  in  October  1985 
a  weekly  foreign  exchange  auction  was  installed  • 
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Examining  recent  changes  in  Zambian  policies  and  the 
different  dialogue  initiatives between  GRZ  and  the 
rlonors  leads  to  two  observations: 
n·  Even  though  chronologically the  first,  the  GRZ-EC 
dialogue  became  Less  important  for  GRZ  than  its  dialog~e 
with  the  World  Bank  and  the  IMF  which  rapidly  resulted 
in  sizeable  loans.  The  dialogue  with  the  EC  lost  momentum 
because  it did  not  prove  possible  to  give  a  quick 
operational  follow  up  to  the  1982  Special  Programme  of 
Action.  This  was, -arleast  in part·, -due  to  lack of-
administrative  capacity on  the  Zambian  side. 
b·  There  is  nevertheless  a  striking  coherence  in  the 
conclusions  that  came  out  of  the different  committees 
and  groups.  In  spite of  the diversity of  the  participants 
the  resulting  documents  and  statements  led  (with  some 
difference  in  emphasi~)  to  the  same  orientations  for 
Zambian  food  policies: 
- increase  the  productivity of  small  scale producers 
(subsistence  and  emergent  farmers)  especially through 
reasonable price  incentives; 
- less  priority for  state  farms; 
-encourage  competition between  parastatals  and  private 
firms  in  the  marketing  of agricultural  produce  and 
inputs. 
2.2.3.  Changes  in  Zambian  food  policies  (since  1980) 
Since  1980,  GRZ  has  implemented  a  large-number of policy 
reforms  consistent  with  the  recommendations  that  came  out 
of  the  food  strategy dialogue.  It is difficult,  however,  to 
assess  the  extent  to  which  these  reforms  were  carried out 
as  a  result  of the  GRZ-EC  dialogue  since  this became  absorbed 
in a  broader  policy dialogue  with other donors • 
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It  is  important  to  stress  the  profounrl  effects  that  the 
ex~hnnge rate  adjustments,  particularly the  auctioning 
of  for·L'igrl  exchilngc  (since  October  1985),  have  on  food 
and  agriculture.  In  principle,  the  agricultural  ~ector 
should benefit  from  th~se changes.  Even  though  imported 
inputs  (such  as  fertilizers)  have  become  more  expensive, 
the  prices  of  agricultural  produce  should  also  increase 
because  they  are  influenced  by  world  market  prices.  Emergent 
farmers  should benefit  more  than  commercial  farmers  who 
depend  more  on  imported  inputs.  The  effects of  the  exchange 
rate  adjustments  should  be  felt  over  the  coming  years. 
Since  1980,  producer  prices  for  most  crops  (particularly 
food)  have  been  regularly  increased beyond  the  general 
Level  of  inflation,  thus  increasing the  real  income  of 
farmers.  Traditional  drought  resistant  staples  (such  as 
millet  and  cassava)  have  increased  in significance,  having 
been  included  in  the official marketing  system.  Prices  for 
such  traditional  crops  were  increased more  rapidly  than 
prices  for  other  crops.  Consumer  prices  for  all  food 
commodities  except  maize  have  gradually  been decontrolled 
fn  order  to  allow  cost  recovery of  the  marketing  organizations. 
This  has  led  to substantial  price  increases  for  sensitive 
commodities "such  as  bread,  sugar  and  cooking oil. 
Marketing  of  crops  (except  maize)  and  inputs  (except  fertilizeri 
has  been  Liberalized  so  that  the  private  sector  can  compete 
with  parastatals.  Starting  with  the  1985/86  season  producer 
crop  prices  (except  maize)  are  floor  prices.guaranteed  by 
the  parastata ls.  Responsibility .for. i ntra-provi nc ia L 
marketing  (including  maize  and  fertilizer)  has  been  trans-
ferred  from  the  National  Agricultural  Marketing  Board 
(NAMBOARD)  to  the  Provincial  Cooperatives.  NAMBOARDts  staff 
has  been  reduced  from  6,000  to  2,000 and  i~s operating 
deficit  diminished  considerably. 
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Despite  this  impressive  list of  policy measures,  many 
further  changes  are  still required  to  strengthen  the 
agricultural  sector  and  guarantee  food  security.  The 
<:tJJrcnt  rrnp  sr:-.1son  <1985/86)  is  going  to  be  particularly 
difficult  because  of  the  rapid  fall of  the  national  currency 
following  the  introduction of  auctioning.  GRZ  has  taken 
measures  t6 protect  both  the  purchasing  power  of  consumers, 
by  holding  down  fhe  price of  mai~e which  is  the  dominant 
staple  food,  and  that of  farmers  by  holding  down  the  price 
of  fertilizers.  As  a  result,  subsidies  for  these  two  products 
will  be  a  major  burden .on the  government budget. thj~.  ye.a.r. 
This  situation will  also  slow  down  the  process  of  liberali-
zation  because  the  controlled  (and  subsidized)  maize  price 
prevents  private  traders  from  entering  the  maize  trade  becaus~ 
they  do  not  have  access  to  subsidies. 
2.2.4.  Community  support  for  the  Zambian  strategy 
Since  its start in  1975  Community  cooperation with  Zambia 
has  put  a  strong  emphasis  on  agriculture.  Lome  I  allocated 
47  t  of  programmable  resources  to  the agricultural  sector. 
Under  Lome  II  this  percentage  was  further  increased  to  around 
52  t.  Furthermore,  in order  to  support  the  Zambian  food 
strategy  the  Lome  II  indicative  programme  was  increased  from 
53  MECU  to  58  MECU  and  the  additional  amount  was  earmarked 
for  agriculture.  The  Lome  II programme  was  adjusted  and 
certain actions  we~e added,  particularly in the  following 
areas:  traditional  crop  development  <sorghum,  cassava), 
extension of  animal  traction  (derivation)  and  food  storage. 
In  addition  to  Lome  II adjustments,  Zambia  has  benefited 
from  the  Community's  Special  Action  Programme  to  Combat 
Hunger  in  the  World  (art.  958).  The  1983 allocation of  4  MECU 
was  used  to  finance  essential  imports  of  farm  implements  and 
veterinary  chemicals.  The  1984  allocation  was  used  in  the  strug~ 
against  tse  tse  infestation.  Finally~  Zambia  received  sub-
stantial  amounts  of  Community  food aid.  On  average,  Zambia 
obtained  18,000 tonnes  of  cereals  (essentially maize)  per  year 
since  1981,  together  with  dairy  products  (skimmed  milk  powder 
and  butter oil)  for  reconstitution and  sale in  the  poorer  urba-
districts. 18. 
The  use  of  the  counterpart  funds  generated  bv  food  aid 
has  not  yet  found  a  satisfactory  solutio~.  However,  at 
ll1i~  mom~nt  counterpart  funds  cover  part  of  the  Local 
custs  of  some  rural  EDF  projects  (e.g.  agricultural  credit 
in  the  maize  extension project).  It  is  foreseen  that  this 
approach  will  be  extended  to  other projects. 
The  orientations  for  Lorn~  III  as  presented  in  the 
Indicative  Programme  for  Zambia,  signed  in  December  1985 
are  in  Line  with  the  food  strategy approach.  90  t  of 
programmable  funds  will  be  concentrated on  rural  and 
agricultural  development.  With  respect  to  policy measures 
the  government  has  agreed: 
- to  continue  its policy of agricultural  price  incentives 
and  to  move  towards  prices  that  reflect  regional 
comparative  advantages; 
- to  improve  the  insiitutional  framework  for  rural  credit.; 
- to  reorganile agricultural  research  and  extension. 
Community  supp0rt  will  be  concentrated  particularly on: 
- improvements  of  agricultural  support  services  (research, 
extension,  training,  credi~>; 
- import  programmes  linked  to  the  concentration  area; 
- actions  in  the  following  fields:  health,  nutrition, 
water  supply,  child spacing  and  environmental  conservation  . 
. I. 2.3~  FOOD  STRATEGIES  IN  OTHER  ACP  STAT~S 
REVIEW  OF  LOME  III  PROGRAMMING 
19. 
1\fter  llie  inilial  pha5e  during  which  the  food  strategy approach 
w~5  implemented  in  four  countries,  this  approach  should  now 
become  a  guiding  factor  in  a  more  general  way for  the  EC  1 s 
cooperation with  other  developing  countries,  particularly  in 
Africa. 
The  third  Lorn~  Convention  confirms  a  generalisation of  the 
approach, .both  in_ t.e.rms  of  pr:.inciple  and  prac.ti.c~l 
implementation. 
- As  regards  the  objectives:  strengthening  food  security  is 
mentioned  (together  with  desertification control)  as  one 
of  the priority objectives  of  the  Convention.  For  example 
on  agricultural  cooperation,  article  12  states: 
"Operations  in this field  shall  be  designed  and  executed 
to ·support  the  agricultural  and  food  policies or strategies 
adopted by  the  ACP  States". 
-As  regards  the  programming  process:  the  sectoral  concentration 
of  cooperation  and  the  strengthening of policy dialogue  with 
the  governments  of  beneficiary countries  create  the  preconditio~s 
for  a  food  strategy approach.  Furthermore,  the  programming 
process  is  tightly structured in order  to  ensure  better  co-
ordination with  the  Member  States  and  with  other  donors  both 
at  national  level and  at  headquarters'  level •. 
-As  regards  the  modes  of  action:  the  increased flexibility of 
financial  and  technical  assistance  will  enable  support  to  be 
given  for  sectoral  development  programmes  or  for  policy 
reforms.  Furthermore,  conditions  have  been  created for  a 
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better  integration or  different  cooperation  instruments 
(e.g.  financial  and  technical  assistance  and  food  aid). 
~.S. 1.  Overview  of  the  Indicative  Pro•Jr.1mrne:.  <IP~) 
At  this  moment  about  35  Indicative  Programmes  have  been 
signed,  of  which  25  concern  African  countries.  It  is 
interesting  to  examine  to  what  extent  the  priority 
objectives  of  the  Convention  have'·been  respected  and  how 
the  new  programming  principles  have  been  applied. 
A critical  analysis  of  these  programmes  using  a  number  of 
indicators  Leads  to  the  following  conclusions: 
Con centra t ion 
On  the  whole  about  80% of  programmable  assistance  is 
reserved  for  the  concentration  area,  which  in  virtually 
all  countries,  is  defined as  the  food  and  agricultural 
s~ctor in the  broad  sense,  including  ~ction to  conserve 
natural  resources  and  improve  living conditions  of  the 
rural  population. 
Food  policies 
In  connection  with  the  agri-rural  concentration area, 
most  of  the  IPs  specify the  necessary policy measures  to 
be  taken  to  create  a  favourable  "environment"  for  specific 
actions.  These  measures  can,  in  many  cases,  be  considered 
as  an  outline  for  a  food  strategy and  the  starting  point 
for  a  dialogue  with  the  governments.  The  policy  measures 
mentioned  most  frequently  are: 
- food  market  liberalisation  and  strengthening of  the 
role  of  private  traders  in marketing; 
- price  policy reform; 
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- reorgani zat io.n  and  restructuring of government 
institutions or parastatals  dealin~ with  rural 
development:  extension servict:.'s,  credit  CJI'9Jlli~ations, 
input  supply  services,  etc.; 
- land  tenure  adjustment~ to  create  a  more  favourable 
environment  for  private  rural  investment  Cland 
improvement). 
ln  certain  cases  it is stipulated that  sectoral  programmes 
or strategies will  be  worked  out  -e.g. on  desertification 
control  or  maintenance. of  rural  roads.  On  the ·whole,  the 
explicit  references  to policy  measures  which  the  governments 
are  committed  to  undertake  constitute an  important  advance 
on  previous  indicative  programmes  and  create  the  conditions· 
for  more  efficient  cooperation. 
Types  of  action  foreseen 
In addition  to  the  policy measures  the  IPs  also  contain 
indications  on  the  types  of actions  that  could be  financed 
by  the  sixth  EOF.  Actions  in  the  following  specific  areas 
were  mentioned  frequently: 
- increase of agricultural  and  food  production 
(particularly by smallholders)  through  irrigation, 
but  also  by  intensifying  rainfed.agriculture and 
through  improvements  in  livestock  and  fisheries; 
- strengthening of agricultural  support~services  (including 
credit  facilities); 
- support  for  the  development  of  grass  roo~s 
rural  and  farmers  organizations; 
-desertification control; 
improvements  in  living  conditions  in  rural  areas 
(training,  health,  water  supply)~ 
. I. 22. 
It should  be  noted  that  relativ•.•Ly  Little  attention 
was  paid  to  consumer  and  nutritional  aspects. 
Equally,  actions  to  strengthen  the  role  of  Wulll•::.  as 
agricultural  producers  were  generally not  mentioned. 
Integration  of different  cooperation  instruments 
Apart  from  the  Sahel  countries  a~d  ~  few  others  such 
as  Tanzania,  Burundi  and  Madagascar,  relatively  Little 
attention  was  paid  to  the  integration of  food  aid 
(directly or  indirectly through  use  of  counterpart  funds) 
in  the  development  process  and  to  its  combination  with 
financial  and  technical  cooperation. 
Coordination 
An.  important  element  o.f  the  food  strategy  approach  is 
to  improve  coordination  among  different  donors  a~d 
government  agencies  dealing  with  agriculture  and  food. 
The  Lome  III programming  process  Lea9ing  to  the  Indicative 
Programmes  implies  close  concertation  between  the  Commission 
and  the  Member  States•  development  c6operation agencies, 
which  should  take  place  both  within the  beneficiary 
country  and  also  at  the  cent~e  (Programming  Committees). 
In  many  cases  this  coordination  is extended  to  include. 
international organizations  and  other  donors  Csuch  as 
the  Nordic  countries). 
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2.3.2.  Some  specific  cases 
Rwnnda 
The  Indicative  Programme  for  Rwanda,  signed  in  December 
1985,  is  fully  in  line  with  the  Community's  support  for 
Rwandan  food  policy.  It  is  foreseen  that  80  t  of 
programmable  assistance  under  Lorn~  III will  be  used  for 
tl1e  food  strategy and  rural  development.  The  government 
has  committed  itself  to  give  absolute priority to  the 
main  food  strategy  themes  such  as  intensification of 
agriculture,  strengthening of  food  marketing  channels, 
prevention of  soil  degradation,  encouragement  for  small 
and  medium  scale  rural  enterprises  (to provide  an 
alternative  source  of  employment  and  revenue  for  rural 
populations),  and  raising  awareness  about  demographic 
issues.  In  fact  these  themes  will  figure  in  the  new 
five  year  plan which  is  in  preparation  (1987-91). 
Some  of  the  broad  types  of  action  that  are  foreseen 
include:  improving  access  to  rural  areas,  extension, 
rural  credit,  food  storage  and  support  for  nutritional 
centres. 
Though  there  was  a  break  in  contact,  coordination within 
the  "Groupe  Euro-Rwandais"  (government,  CEC  Delegation, 
Belgium,  France  and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany) 
again  functions  normally. 
Satisfactory progress  is  being  made  in carrying out  the 
Special  Programme  under  art.  958,  both  as  regards  the 
section on  marketing  support  and  the  section dealing  with 
agricultural  inputs  and  intensification.  In  the  course  of 
1986  a  study  will  be  made  to  obtain,  for  the  first  time, 
a  clear  idea  of  food  marketing  problems  in  Rwanda.  This 
study,  together  with  the  one  dealing  with  soil  potential 
will  help  in  the  setting up  of  concrete  proj~cts/programmes 
focusing  on  better  use  of  Rwanda's  agricultural  resources . 
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Though  the  Indicative  Programme  for  KP.nya  has  not  yet 
been  fi  rl~ll. i 7CU,  a'  numiJer  0  r yu i ue l i IW~  llilVC:  l.Jcen  worked 
out  during  the  continuing  dialogue  with  the  government. 
These  guidelines  are  a  Logical  extension of .the  actions 
taken  by  the  EC  in  support  of  the  food  strategy in  the 
past.  The  government  has  already taken  a  Large  number  of 
measures  to  improve  food  security and  its overall  economic 
strategy puts  heavy  emphasis  on  food  and  agriculture. 
The  efficiency of  Kenya's  food  supply  arrangements  was 
demonstrated  by  the  way  the  1983-84  food  shortage  was 
handled.  Nevertheless,  the  reform  of  ~he National  Cereali 
Produce  Board  (NCPB)  remains  a  complex  and  politically 
difficult  issue.  It  should  be  no~ed'that the  government 
recently  requested  EC  assistance  for  NCPB  restructuring. 
As  regards  coordination  of  foorl  strategy  implementation.which 
since  the  enrl  of  198l,  has  taken  place  through  the  "AgricL•ltural 
Sub  Committee",  there  is  c.Jr.~idbrahl€  scope  for  improvemen~ · 
particularly  on  operatioral  ~~rects.  Furthermore,  some  general 
themes  related  to  the  food  strateny are  not  dealt  with  adequa:!l. 
in  the  coordination  framework. 
Senegal 
Strengthening  food  security in  combination  with  desertificati~n 
control  constitutes  the  concentration area  in  Senegal's 
Indicati~e Programme,  with  85  t  of  programmable  res~urces 
earmarked  for  it.  The  IP  also  pr~vides  for  a  geographical 
concentration of  actions  in  the  Senegal  river area,  focusing 
particularly on  irrigation.  The  IP  also explicitly mentions 
the  need  to  use  the  funds  available  from  the  "Joint  Food  Aid 
Fund"  for  a  support  programme  for  traditional  cereals . 
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Tanzania 
The  Indicative  Programme  has  been  signed  in  July  1985. 
In  Line  with  government  priorities  YO  '1.  of  programmable 
resources  under  Lome  Ill will  be  used  to  support  agriculture 
and  livestock. 
During  the  past  few  years,  the  government  has  already 
taken  a  number  of  important  measures  concerning  food  and 
agriculture.  In  particular,  producer  prices  for  the  main 
food  products  were  increased  in  real  terms  and  maize 
subsidies  for  consumers  were  abolished.  Budgetary  transfers 
to  parastatals were  diminished  and  a  number  of  these  bodies 
were  restructured.  Also  some  import  Liberalization  has  been 
introduced  since  1984. 
In  the  IP  the  government  agreed  to  continue  and  consolidate 
its efforts  in  the  area  of  food  and  to  put  particular 
emphasis  on  marketing,  producer  prices  and  the  supply of 
basic  consumer  goods  to  rural  areas.  Tanzania  will  also 
continue  to  allocate  close  to  30  1 of  its budgetary  resources 
to  rural  development;  this is  one  of  the  highest  levels  in 
Africa. 
Integration of  food  aid  counterpart  funds  within  the 
concentration area  is explicitely foreseen  in the  IP. 
However,  despite  the  considerable efforts  ~lready undertaken, 
the  distortion between official  controlled prices  and 
parallel  market  prices  remains  an  important  constraint 
on  the  agricultural  sector.  This  distortion results  mainly 
from  over-valuation  of  the  currency.  It is  p~rticularly 
hard  to  find  an  adequate  strategy to  diminish  this 
distortion. 
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In  lauching  its  initiative  to  assist  the  ACP  countries  with  the  implemen-
l<~tion  of  food  strategies,  the  EC  made  an  important  innovation .in  its 
dt~velornH!nt  polir.y.  J1'  rlid  not  simnly.take  on  hoilrrJ  the  food  strategy 
cu~~eept  a~  set  out  by  the  World  food  Council  in  1979.  It  placed  this 
concent  in  a  new  framework  of  cooperation  for  development  :  the  integrated 
arproach  to  tl1e  solution  of  food  problems,  implementation  by  i~proved 
coordination  and  a  commitment  to  dialogue  with  beneficiary  countries. 
3.1.  Food  agricultural  development  policies 
Marketing  and  pricing 
The  period  at  the  end  of  the  1970s  and  beginning  of  the  1980s  was 
characterised generally  by  a  g~ter awareness,  on  the  part  of  African 
countries  and  aid  donors  alike  of  the  errors  made  in  the  area  of 
rural  development,  particularly as  regards  food  production. 
Efforts  at  reGtructuring  were  made  fir~t of  all  in  the  area  of 
marketing  and  pricing  polici~  where  distortions  were  most  flagrant. 
Measures  have  been  taken  in  a  large  number  of  African  countries  to 
Liberalize  food  marketing  and  improve  prices  for  agricultural  producers. 
In  this  way  a  more  favourable  economic  environment  for  both  food 
production  and  marketing  was  created.In  examining  some  of  the  experiences 
over  recent  years,  it is possible  to  identify  certain crucial  issues .: 
a.  In  most  countries,  market  Liberalisation  has  increased  the  role  of 
private  traders  in  food  marketing.  There  is  nevertheless  the  r1sk 
that  certain priveleged  groups  may  come  together  in  order lo 
secure  a  trading  monopoly  on  the  cereals  market. 
In  order  to  reduce  this  tendency  without  diminishing  the  efficiency 
of  private  sector  trading  it  is  necessary  : 
.I. to  ensure  a  reasonable  degree  of  competition  in  the  market,  in 
particular  by  encouraging  producers  to  organise  themselves,  in 
trading  cooperatives  for  instance,  and  to  carry  out  certain 
marketing  activities 
- to assist  in  structuring. and  developing  private  sector  tradtng 
(training,  credit  facilities  etc ••• > 
- to  give  parastatals  the  task  of  regulati~g the  market 
i.e. playing  the  role  of buyer/seller of  last  resort  in  order 
27. 
to  ensure  floor  prices  for  producers  and  ceiling prices  for 
consumers  • 
b·  Private  initiative and  public  intervention  should  complement  each 
other  not  only  in  market  management  but  also  in  "food  security" 
arrangements,  which  involves  ensuring  supplies  of  basic  foodstuffs  to 
all  regions  and  all  population  classes. 
Decentralised  storage  facilities  closer  to  prcducers  should  be  encouraged 
as  a  way  of  reducing  the  infrastructure  burden. 
c.  The  most  difficult  prnhlem  is  pr:~ably that  nf  pricina  which  involves 
reconciling  objectives  which  are  at  least  partly contradictory,  i.e. 
ensuring  that  prices· prc·.·ide  i:"':e'ltives  for  the  producer  and 
are  within  reach  of  the  consuner,  toqether  with  abolishing 
subsidies  in  the  cereal~ sector.  The  current  eco~omic crisis, 
characterised  by  budget  defici~s and  freezes  on  the  purchasing  power  of 
urban  populations,  has  made  it  extremely. djfficult  to  achieve  the  aim 
of  providing  incentive prices  to  producers  without  having  recourse  to 
subsidies.  Certain  savings  can  be  made  through  more  effective  marketing 
. arrangements  but  it  is  clear  that  the  only  way  to  tackle  the  root  ~f the 
problem  is  to  increase  yields  so  as  to  allow  producers  to  increase  their 
purchasing  power  without  causing  a  rapid  increase  in  consumer  prices. 
Moreover,  expenditure  made  by  the  agricultural  population  (on  agri·cultural 
inputs,  consumer  goods  etc •• )  should  in  turn  provide  ihe  basis  for 
increased  income  of  non-agricultural  groups  (growth  in  agriculture 
Leading  to  growth  in other  sectors>. 
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Strengthening  production 
This  l.<~sl  observation  implies  interventinn  in  the  production  sector· 
income  transfers  from  urban  centres  to  the  rural  sector  by  means  of 
price  adjustments  are  insufficient;  further  incentives  have  to 
be  given  to  producers  to  invest  in  and  intensify their  land-use.  This 
means  in  particular  strengthening  the  role  of  family  small  holdings 
and  groups  of  producers. 
Reforms  in  the  support  structures  for  rural  communities  are  an 
essential  complement  to  pricing  and  marketing  measures.  They  should. 
seek · · 
- to  promote  private  initiative by  liberalising  the  supply  of  inputs 
and  services  ; 
- to  encourage  producers  and  their  organisations  to play  a  more  imp6rtant 
role,  by  giving  them  responsibility  for  more  activities,  and  obliging 
them  to obtain  inputs  and  services  at  market  prices  ; 
- to  improve  the  efficiency of  support  structures  and  extension 
services  ; 
- to  promote  the  intagration of  agriculture .and  livestock  (fo~ traction}. 
These  reforms  should  be  accompanied  by  action  in  the  area  of 
agricultural  structures  designed  to  increase  efficiency  in production. 
Several  countries  have  embarked  on  measures  in this  area  such  as  : 
a.  land  reform  and  measures  to  achieve  a  b~tter  bala~ce between 
different  types  of  land  holding  with  spe~ial attention  to  small 
and  medium  sized  farms 
b.  irrigation projects  designed  in  particular  to  upgrade  small  irrigated 
areas. 
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In  the  same  context,  but  going  beyond  the  specific  problem  of  agricultural  · 
structures,  it  should  be  noted  that  longer  term  measures  to protect  natural 
resources  arc  necessary  in order  to  safeguard  agricultural  potential. 
In  this  whole  field,  the  problem  of  access  to  credit  facilities  (seasonal 
credit  as  well  as  credit  for  investment  purposes)  deserves  particular attention. 
It  is  not  so  much  a  question  of  providing additional  financial  resources 
for  rural  comm~nities but  more  a  method  of  providing  a  financial  back-up  to 
rural  trading  and  mobilising  the  resources  available  in  rural  communities 
~savings)  for  productive  investment.  Efficient  and  non-discriminatory 
·financial  facilities  in  rural  areas are  essential  to  the  development  of 
family  small-holdings.  Measures  to  this  end  have  been  taken  in  several 
countries  both  as  regards  public  or para-statal  bodies  (Development 
banks  for  example)  and  within  local  communities  (savings  associations  etc.), 
working  where  appropriate  through  NGOs  active  in  this fields. 
This  is  undoubtedly  an  area  which  should  in  future  become  the  subject  of 
much  more  serious  consideration. 
Further  efforts are  required  in  the  area  of  applied agricultural  research 
in  order  to  develop  effective  and  durab~e technologies.  Relatively  little 
attention has  been  given  to this  aspect  in  the  context  of  food  strategies, 
yet  there are  a  number  of  recent  initiatives  to  build  up  national  reseach 
capacity,  to  promote  research  at  regional  level  (CGIAR  for  example),  to set 
up  "networks"  (R3S)  or  promote  information  exchange  (e.g.  CTA).  Apart  from 
action  in  the  field of  research  as  such,  one  should  take  note  of  those 
countries  (Senegal  for  example)  which  are  seeking  to  strenghen  the  links 
between  research,  seed  development,  the  extension  services  and  the 
farming  community,  highlighting  the  role  the  Latter  can  play  in ·seed 
p~oduction and  in  refining  technical  "packages". 
Consumption  and  nutrition 
Though  consumption  is  the sole purpose  of  production,  this  aspect 
has  been  relatively neglected  in  work  on  food  strategies  and  in  the 
indicative  programmes  that  have  be~n examined.  This  should  in future  be 
given  higher priority 
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a.  a  consumer  policy designed  to  (re)  establish  dema~d for  local  products 
in  urban  areas  is  a  necessary  and  natural  extensio~ cf  me~sures in  the 
area  of  marketing  and  production.  By  creating  a  stable  market  for 
local  food  stuffs  an  incentive  effect  on  ~upply can  be  ac~ieved and 
Gt  the  same  time  food  rleficits  can  be  rerJ,Jr:t:>d, 
b.  nutritional  orogrammcs  for  vulnerable  or  disadvantaged  groups  did 
not  receive  much  attention,  probably  as  a  result  of  the  economic 
difficulties  facing  most  countries.  Deciding  on  priorities  is  not 
easy  - should  food  distribution  and  the  task  of  feeding  the  whole 
population  come  before  to  stimulate  production  ? 
One  solution  ~  though  not  applicable  in  all. situations  can  be  found 
in  those  measures  which  have  both  a.nutritional  effect  and  a  positive 
impact  on  production,  such  as  food  for  work  schemes. 
c.  Nutional  programmes  should  be  undertaken  in  conjunction  with  health  and 
demographic  schemes,  for  instance  in measures  in  favour  of  mothers  and 
children  and  child  spacing. 
General  policy 
It  is  clear  that  the  impact  of  general  development  policies  and  socio-
economic  policy  on  the  implementation  of  food  strategies  was  gravely 
underestimated  at  first.  Both  in  Mali  and  in  Zambia,  and  generally 
alsewhere,  it  has  been  the  general  economic  constraints  (The  national  budget, 
balance  of  payments,  wage  policy etc •• )  which  have  defined  the  margin  of" 
manoeuvre  for  food  policy.  This  will  have  to  be  taken  into  account  in  future 
more  specifically  in  relation  to  the particular circumstances  of  each 
country.  Mali  provides  an  interesting example  in  this  respect  since  the 
development  plan  was  worked  out  around  a  central  objective 
which  was  the  food  strategy  and  desertification  control. 
Another  aspect  which  has  been  relatively neglected  is  the  regional 
dimension  of  development  policy and  food  production  in  general.  This  was 
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discussed  at  a  recent  colloquium  which  took  place  in  O?kar  under  the  aegis 
of  the  ~lurld  Food  Council  and  the  French  governro~nt.  Ir1  <1ddition  to 
general  recommendations  on  the  need  to  stimulate  cooperation  at  regional 
level,  the  colloquium  came  to  a  number  of  rather  pragmatic  conclusions 
reaffirming  the  priority  to  be  attached  to  defining  and  implementing 
adequate  policies  at  national  level  which  should  at  the  outset  take 
account  of  the  regional  dimension  of  food  security and  the  need  develop  to 
international  commercia
1  relationships  building~~ the  significant  volume  of 
traditional  atbeH-illic-it  trade  taking place-between  neighbouring--countries 
in  Africa. 
In  general,  the  availability of  reliable statistical data  has  an  influence 
both  on  policy formulation  and  on  the  monitoring  of  policy  implementation. 
Support  for  the  collection and  processing of  data  needs  to  be  strengthened 
(taking  account  of  current  advances  in  computer  hardware  and  software) 
and  efforts  should  be  made  to  integrate  ad  hoc  interventions  in  a  more  global 
apprcach  to statistical  data  (on  agriculture)  in beneficiary  countries • 
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3.2.  Methodology 
The  rnillll  r.har;11:t:cri~;tics  of  the  new  "food  strateqy"  apprvar:h  to  cooperation 
for  dcveloDm~nt  have  been  : 
a.  strengthening of  coordination  between donors; 
b.  a  better  integration of  the  different  technical  and  financial  instruments 
of  cooperation; 
c.  a  commitment  to  dialogue  and  concertation  of  efforts  with  the  authorities 
of  the  beneficiary  country  in  order  to  ensure  consistency between  coope-
ration  and  national  development  policy. 
Certain  obse~vations on  these  three  facets  can  be  made  in  the  Light  of 
experience. 
Much  progress  has  undoubtedly  been  made  in  recent  years  as  regards  coordination 
between  donors  and  with  governments  of  developing  countries.  Despite  this, 
much  remains  to  be  done,  in  particular 
a.  coordination  between  Member  States  and  the  Commission  needs  to  be 
stepped  up  both  at  local  level  and  at  the  centre.  There  have  been 
some  achievements  but  there  is  still scope  for  more  effective  coordination. 
A new  impetus  is  urgently  required  given'that  coordination should  b~ an 
essential  component  of  Community  initiatives; 
b.  efforts  at  coordination  should  thereafter  be  extended  to  include  other 
donors,  especially  those  having  a  major  presence  in  the  country  in  question, 
in  order  to  obtain  the  full  effect  of  Community  initiatives. 
Advances  have  also  certainly been  made  towards  the  more  integrated  use  of 
development  instruments  in  the  area  of  food  strategy.  There  have  been  etforcs 
to  establish  closer  links  between  food  aid,  the  management  of  food  aid 
counterpart  funds,  the  resources  of  t~e special  programme  to  combat  hunger 
in  the  world  and  Stabex  on  the  one  hand  and  the  funds  available  in  the 
context  of  the  indicative  programme  on  the  other,  in order  to  implement 
food  strategy objectives.  The  new  Lome  Convention  opens  up  further  oppor-
tunities  in  this  respect. 
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At  the  practical  level,  some  adaptation  in  procedures  for  allocating food 
aid  are  necessary,  given  it  a  more  countractual  rature  implying multi-
;nmu.ll  programming  and  advance  planning  on  the  use  of  the  counterpart  funds 
~JL'IW rat  Prf, 
The  flexible  use  of  food  aid  can  be  illustrated by  the  contribution 
the  Community  has  made  this  year  to  regulating  the  market  for  food  products, 
exploiting  the  whole  range  of  food  aid  instruments  (including substitution 
under  article  929  and  triangular operations)  in  order  to  help countries 
with  food  surpluses  avoid  a  sharp  fall  in  pric~s. 
To  achieve  effective dialogue  between  donors  and  beneficiary governments 
is  by  no  means  straightforward.  A  Learning  process  is  necessary  in order 
to  find  the  right  angle  of  approach  and  the  right  degree  of  specificity 
in  the  matters  to  be  dealt  with.  It  is vital,  above  all,  to  remove  any 
fears  on  the  part  of  beneficiary  countries  about  the  implications  of  this 
type  of  dialdgue.as  regards  e~ternal  interference  in  domestic  concerns. 
Experience  shDWS  that  dialogue  can  be  most  effective if 
a.  the  subject  matter  is  clearly defined  and  directly  related to  potential 
aqion by  donors; 
b.  the  dialogue  is  in  the  direct  interest  of  the  authorities of  the 
beneficiary  country  (supplementary  resources,  greater  flexibility  etc •• >; 
c.  the  public  bodies  with  which  the  dialogue  take  place  are  clearly defined 
and  have  full  authority  in  the  field  in question. 
In  focusing  on  specific  policies  it  is  nevertheless  important  not  to 
Lose  sight  of  the  more  general  discussions  and  consultations  which  take 
place  under  the  aegis  of  other  bodies  such  as  UNDP  Round  Tables,  IBRD 
consultative  groups  or  specific  negotiations  with  the  IMF  (standby}  or 
the  IBRD  (SAU. 
Coherence  between  these  various  types  of  dialogue  is essential  in  so  far 
as  policies  adopted  in  one  arena  will  determine  or  at  least  influence 
the  chances  of  success  in  other  areas. 
. I. 34. 
Information  exchange  as  regards  these  various  discussions  is  therefore 
vital  anrl  the  central  role  played  by agencies  such  as  the  IMF  or  the 
lURD  sl1uuld  be  acknowledged. 
As  regards  the  Community  dialogue  with  the  •food  strategy  countries",  it should 
be  said  that,  after  the  first  period  which  was  very  constructive  enabling 
the  broad  lines  of  the  strategy to  be  defined,  it often  became  difficult  to 
set  our  the  various  policy options  in  technical  terms  and  to  translat~ them 
into  plans  for  practical  action. 35. 
3.3.  Future  prospects 
The  time  has  come  now  after  four  years  to  move  beyond  the  initial 
experimental  ~hase of  Community  support  for  implementing  food  s~rategies  in 
the  four  countries. 
Conclusions  need  to  be  drawn  from  this  experience  and  brought  to  the 
benefit  of  the  other  countries  which  are  committed  in  the  context  of  their 
Lome  III  Indicative  Programme  to  drawing  up  and  carrying  out  some  form  of 
food  strategy  with  Community  support. 
Experience  has  shown  the  need  to  respect  th~ specific  circumstances  of  each 
country  and  to  be  aware  that  progress  can  be  made  in  very  different  ways 
(even  avoiding  any  explicit  reference  to  the  food  strategy  concept).  As 
regdrds  the  content  of  cooperation  programmes,  as  a  critical  review  of the 
indicative  programmes  shows,  there  is still  much  work  to  be  done  in 
formulating  more  precisely  the  sectoral  or  sub-sectoral  policies 
that  can  hel~ achieve  the  broadly  defined objectives.  In  the  absence. 
of  a  policy link  between  objectives  and  specific actions,  there  is  a  very 
real  danger  of  failing  to  exploit  all  the  new  possibilities  under  Lome  III. 
Special efforts are  required  in  each  c3se  to  work  out  the  policy  framework 
for  a  set  of  measures  consistent  with  and  contributing directly to  the 
objective  in question.  There  also  needs  to  be  some  monitoring of  governmental 
commitments  in  the  concentration  sector.  This  is  in iact  a  new  task  in 
addition  to  that  link,ed  to  project  identification. 
The  Community  's  role  in  the  group  of  donors  and  in  respect  of  the  beneficiary 
government  also  needs  to  be  worked  out  more  already  in  the  light  of  each 
particular situation.  Although  each  case  is  different  and  there  can  there  can 
thus  be  no  single  formula,  the  Community  abviously has  a  s~ecific  contribution 
.to  make.  This  will  be  influenced  by  the  dynamics  of .Community  coordination,  an~ 
the  relative  importance  of  its financial  contribution  to  the  country  in questic· 
but  it  should  above  all  distinguish  itself  be  the quality  of  the  proposals 
it  puts  forward  based  on  its broad  experience  in  the  field  of  food  and 
agricultural  development. 
. I . 36. 
Until  now  there  has  been  no  attempt  to  implement  food  strategies outside 
the  framework  of  the  Lome  Convention. 
Over  and  above  efforts  to  generalise  the  food  strategy approach  the  all 
ACP  countries,  consideration  shoul~ be  given  to  adapting  this  approach 
to  the  relations,  e.g.  in  the  framework  of  cooperation  agrtcr.1cnts 
bctwet~ the  EC  anrl  Mcditerranear  courtrie~ a:  wrll  as  with  countries 
ir  ~sia and  Latin  America. 
For  the  food  strategy  concept  to  be  applied  in  such  situations,  a  flexible 
approach  is  needed  which  can  be  adapted  to  the  neens  of  the  country  in 
question  and  to  the  particular position of  the  Community  in  the  country. 
In  this  sense, the possibilities are  being expl6red,  in  the  Mediterranean  region 
e.g.,  to  support  partners  adopting  a  reasonable  programme  for  the  reduction· 
of  their food  dependancy.  In  the  same  way,  programmes  in  support  of  the 
strengthening  of  food  security  (in  Latin  America  e.g.)  and  self  sufficiency 
'' 
in  certain  food  stuffs  (certain Asian  countries  e.g.)  are  being  implemented 
or  studied  •• 